Network Diversity and Economic Development: a Comment by Bruggeman, Jeroen
ar
X
iv
:1
01
1.
02
08
v2
  [
cs
.SI
]  
28
 D
ec
 20
10
Network Diversity and Economic
Development: a Comment
Jeroen Bruggeman∗
Abstract
Network diversity yields context-dependent benefits that are not
yet fully-understood. I elaborate on a recently introduced [1] distinc-
tion between tie strength diversity and information source diversity,
and explain when, how, and why they matter. The issue whether
there are benefits to specialization is the key.
1 Introduction
New ideas are created by (re)combining existing ideas and applications
[2, 3, 4]. Business opportunities and jobs are found amidst heteroge-
neous offers and demands [5]. Both novelty and economic welfare
depend on information diversity, be it different kinds of information
for different kinds of opportunities [6]. Seen from a network perspec-
tive, and without much knowledge about the content of information
sources, it’s a challenge to model diversity such that economic, scien-
tific, artistic, and other kinds of success can be predicted.
In a recent paper in Science, Eagle, Macy and Claxton [1], EMC
for short, found support for the relation between diversity and eco-
nomic well-being in a network study of British communities. They
had almost complete telephone data over a month in 2005, obviously
stripped of content. Interestingly, the nodes in this network were the
communities, as sources and recipients of information, not individuals,
for whom numerous benefits of diversity had already been shown in
other studies [7]. However, EMC’s measure did not indicate diversity
of sources, but diversity of time (volume of calls) spent on any given
number of sources instead. This choice seems puzzling at first sight,
and is not explained in their paper. I will go into their measure in
some detail, and then proceed with network diversity in general.
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2 Tie strength diversity
In the normalized Shannon entropy measure EMC propose, pij is the
proportional strength, or value, of the tie (arc) between focal node i
and contact node j, such that
∑i=k
i=1 pij = 1, and ki is the number of
i’s contacts (degree). In their study, pij is community i’s proportional
volume of calls to community j. Although in general, pij 6= pji, in
phone conversations and in many other social relations, information
goes in both directions. Relevant exceptions are written sources of
information, that can be cited but not influenced by their readers.
Normalized entropy is defined as
D(i) =
−
∑k
j=1 pijlog(pij)
log(ki)
(1)
An index of economic welfare did correlate with more equally di-
vided attention across sources as indicated by Eq.1 (r = 0.73).1 This
is intriguing, but we want comprehension, not just correlation. Only
in the extreme case of spending almost all time on one source and
almost neglecting others it’s obvious that diversity of time spent re-
duces diversity of information. Otherwise, and net of institutions and
cognitive limitations, having more sources is better, at least according
to Ron Burt’s theory of brokerage [5] on which EMC build (see Scott
Page’s additional arguments [6]). For sources to provide diverse in-
formation and opportunities indeed, they should not be connected to
each other directly, and not be connected indirectly other than via the
focal node itself [5]; see Fig.1. Neither of these effects is represented
in EMC’s measure, though, whereas other measure that they used
suggested that numbers of sources (r = 0.44) and their lacking direct
links (Burt’s brokerage, r = 0.72) are important. (Burt’s measure
incorporates both effects.)
The network approach helps us to make parsimonious theories,
that abstract away as much as possible from the content of the ties to
make predictions as general as possible. Content matters, obviously,
and a balance has to be found. It seems that to comprehend EMC’s
findings on the diversity of tie strength, we have to take into account
some broad characteristic of their content. To this end it might help if
we contrast generic phone conversations between residential communi-
ties with information transmission in the fields of research and innova-
tion, mostly not by phone. In a comparable network, nodes are then
scientific communities or technology domains [8]. There, individual
inventors must have a skillful command of their sources, for example
1Eq.1 was also used to measure diversity across geographic areas, which correlated with
economic welfare as well (r = 0.58).
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Figure 1: If all nodes divide their attention equally among their contacts, focal
node A should have a lower score on diversity than node B, as in Burt’s measure
for brokerage; EMC’s scores (eq.1) are the same for both. Furthermore, A’s score
should be lower if C andD were connected directly and increase redundancy rather
than diversity for A, which is expressed by Burt’s measure whereas EMC’s scores
stay equal. Finally, B exchanging information with C and D reduces opportunities
for A, which is unnoticed by both EMC’s and Burt’s measures.
scientific literature, patents, or experts, which takes much more time
and effort than maintaining business relations or asking about jobs
on the phone. To cross-fertilize sophisticated knowledge successfully,
knowledge brokerage must be preceded, and followed upon, by a phase
of specialization in these sources [9]. An innovation-dedicated com-
munity can also self-specialize, indicated by a strong tie from the node
to it self that summarizes a myriad of individuals collaborating with,
or citing, each other. EMC’s measure should therefore incorporate
reflexive ties as well, i.e. allowing for the index in Eq.1 the case i = j.
Specialization thus can happen in multiple ways, that have in com-
mon an accumulation of more densely interrelated knowledge wherein
shortcuts and workarounds are discovered. Diversity of tie strength
in cross-sectional data reflects combinations or alterations of special-
ization and brokerage, which, co-depending on network dynamics (see
[9]), indicates good fortune rather than misfortune.
The content of British phone conversations we do not know, but
it’s clear that innovations are by far outnumbered by more mundane
exchanges of information. To transfer complex information, strong
ties are necessary [10], as they are for specialization, while for most
interactions in daily life, like searching a job or selling an item, weak
ties will do [7]. For all those more common cases, strong ties indicate
redundancy rather than progressive knowledge refinement. Dedicat-
ing much attention to a few sources has therefore no advantages, or
only briefly, while it precludes people and their communities from get-
ting non-redundant information elsewhere. It seems that this explains
what EMC found. We may thus conclude that their measure is very
useful indeed, and focuses on one important aspect of diversity that
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was previously not studied separately.2
3 Source diversity
To predict opportunities to create and trade, we should also come to
terms with source diversity. As said, the optimal situation for a focal
node is to have as many different sources as possible, for as far cogni-
tion enables and institutions allow. Our challenge is to appropriately
deal with direct and indirect links between these sources.
For focal node A in Fig.1, if nodes C and D exchange information
directly, A receives more redundant and less diverse information than
if C and D are unconnected. Consequentially, chances for A to recom-
bine information from them to create new opportunities decrease, be
it for business, innovations, or other. Moreover, C and D no longer
need A (or other nodes like B) for them to communicate; A is then
out-competed with respect to benefits resulting from combinations of,
and transactions between, C and D. In the case of direct links be-
tween sources, reduced diversity and increased competition are two
sides of the same coin. Empirically they differ; diversity of informa-
tion and other resources can in principle be observed in social interac-
tions, while competition—if nodes do not show direct rivalry in their
behavior—can’t be observed but has to be inferred, from performance
reduced by it.
Burt’s measure does a good job at capturing the effects of both tie
strength diversity and direct links between sources in one stroke. But
it correlates slightly weaker with economic success than normalized
entropy does [1] and it overlooks nodes one removed from the focal
node that draw information or other resources from the same sources
as the focal node does. If we look again at focal node A in Fig.1, B is
a case in point. Suppose B provides information to C and D that is
useful to them, then they have the advantage first, while A still waits
or never hears about it. If, on the other hand, B uses information
from C and D, the ideas B produces will be more similar to A’s than
if B would use sources unrelated to A. B does not necessarily reduce
A’s diversity but it reduces A’s chances for novelty. In a rare email
network study where also the content of the messages was known to
the researchers, the effect of indirect links (structural equivalence)
2Some credit should go to James Coleman [11], who presented a measure of entropy
(different from EMC’s) in his well-known Introduction to Mathematical Sociology. Ron
Burt used that measure for tie strength diversity, not to assess knowledge source special-
ization, though, but to show that women in an organization got early promotion if they
had one strong tie to a “sponsor,” a higher manager in the organization other than their
own [12]—status specialization, for short.
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on information diversity was indeed insignificant [13]. Other studies
(based on patent data) showed that the effect of this competition
on performance (citation impact) was significantly negative, though
[14, 15]. There, competition was not for information itself, which
does not deplete with usage [16], but for the novelty that could be
created with it and valued by others. What we should measure is not
diversity per se, but potentially useful diversity, to which as few as
possible competitors have access. In sum, like direct links between
sources discussed above, also indirect links increase competition for a
focal node.
Betweenness centrality [17] is the simplest measure that captures
the number of sources under both constraints, of their lacking direct
links and indirect links. To broker diverse information, a focal node
should sit astride on multiple paths (concatenations of ties) between
places where “useful bits of information are likely to air, and provide
a reliable flow of information to and from those places” [5]. The basic
intuition dates back from 1948 [18], and its formalization came inde-
pendently in 1971 [19] and in 1977 [17]. Due to its simplicity, between-
ness is better comprehensible (after working through a few examples),
communicable, and applicable than more sophisticated measures, of
which it’s generally not understood what the underlying social mech-
anisms would be.
For betweenness, of all paths through a focal node from here to
there, only the shortest paths count. But shortest paths can still be
long. Unchangeable information, like chain letters, can travel long
distances [20], but response times to information are heterogeneously
distributed, and the “fat tail” of slow responders strongly slows down
diffusion processes [21]. In our case, shortest paths may not be short
enough, because strategically relevant and manipulable information is
much less reliable over longer paths, and before it reaches a focal node
it has probably already been used by another middle(wo)man along its
way. Diversity is by far the most useful where—and when—the news
breaks [5], while “second hand brokerage” is not [22]. Moreover, long
network paths strongly affect a node’s betweenness scores, whereas
they rarely matter for brokerage. We should therefore constrain be-
tweenness to paths shorter than or equal to three ties in a row, and
call it 3-betweenness for short. It thereby fits squarely into Fowler and
Christakis’ [23] “three degrees rule,” a stylized fact that various sorts
of social influence do not reach further than path lengths of three.
In Fig.1, B has exclusive access to E, and is the gatekeeper with
the power to speed up, interrupt, or distort information from or to E
[24, 25]; B thus enjoys the full benefit of paths from E to other nodes.
Our focal node A, in contrast, has no exclusive sources. There is one
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(shortest) path through it from C to D and another path from C to
D of equal length that does not pass through A. Without any further
information about the network, our initial best bet is that roughly
half of the information exchange between C to D will pass through
A. Assortment (“homophily” [26]), sympathy, and other factors may
bias one channel in favor of another, but the associated tie strength
diversity around the focal we have already captured by EMC’s mea-
sure. We can complement the latter with betweenness that focuses on
a different aspect of diversity. From a focal node’s point of view, diver-
sity of tie strength (or anything else) further afield is less relevant, so
there we may trade off realism for parsimony. This is what between-
ness does, by abstracting away from tie strength. For the presence or
absence of ties, a threshold value should be established depending on
the field of application. Below the threshold, information transfer is
insignificantly weak and then ignored.
Generalizing these intuitions about exclusive and shared access,
3-betweenness of focal node i is the ratio of the shortest paths, gjil,
from j through i to l (under the distance constraint discussed above),
to all shortest paths between these two nodes, gj.l, and then summed
for all pairs of nodes in the network.3 Formally,
CB(i) =
∑
j
∑
j<l
gjil
gj.l
j 6= i 6= l, d(j, l) ≤ 3. (2)
The reader may verify that if the number of direct or indirect links
between i’s sources increases, its 3-betweenness score decreases, and
that direct links have a stronger impact than indirect links have.
4 Test
I tested the two measures on a network of “invisible colleges” of US
inventors (n = 417), analogous to the British communities of citi-
zens. In this case the ties consist of patent citations, that represent
knowledge flows [27], for which I used all patents in the USA (about
two million) over the period 1975—1999. The administrative units
corresponding to the colleges of inventors are technology domains,
wherein patents are categorized. Performance is here measured as ci-
tation impact (number of citations) over the entire period. Domains’
3Notice that if ties are (strictly) asymmetric, a path in one direction is not neces-
sarily the same as a path in the opposite direction. Alternatives to 3-betweenness are
2-betweenness, and 4, 5, etcetera, -betweenness. It remains an empirical question if 3-
betweenness predicts best. In R’s igraph package, 3-betweenness for a graph G can be
computed by betweenness.estimate(G, cutoff=3)
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self-specialization is a prominent knowledge strategy; on average a do-
main has 214 source domains, but pii = 0.53, which is much higher
than it would have been in an equal division of citations over source
domains (0.005). To compare this network with the British commu-
nity network for the effect of diversity on performance, I simplify by
leaving out network dynamics (elaborated in [9]). As the average
path length is short (1.49), there is no difference between betweenness
and 3-betweenness. Both correlate 0.77 with performance, whereas
normalized entropy correlates -0.22. The most successful technol-
ogy domains thus combine brokerage with specialization, which we
can clearly see by using these two measures.4 In Burt’s measure, tie
strength diversity and topological diversity are combined, and as in
this case they point in opposite directions (low entropy, high broker-
age), that measure correlates much lower with performance, 0.19, and
is less informative. Only if they point into the same direction (high
entropy, high brokerage), like in EMC’s study, Burt’s measure is ad-
equate. Interestingly, though, Burt’s discursive theory matches the
entropy and 3-betweenness measures better than his own measure.
Additional tests in a variety of fields should point out if we now have
both correlation and comprehension indeed.
5 Brokerage and Specialization
To assess network diversity for economic development and other ac-
complishments, we may start out with the elegant and simple mea-
sure of 3-betweenness. For valued graphs we complement it with nor-
malized entropy, that should also take reflexive ties into account, if
present. Subsequently, it’s important to know if the field one is about
to investigate is complex for its inhabitants, such that progressive
knowledge or skill refinement yields benefits for them, or is relatively
simple such that we may neglect small bursts of specialization. We
already know that the fields of technology and science are complex, to
which we may add sport, architecture, haute cuisine, art, law, and any
other field where extensive schooling or training are required. (And
if we don’t know, we can figure it out through the effect of normal-
ized entropy.) In all those fields we will find individuals who spend
years on specializing, and have intensive contacts with relatively few
and interconnected sources of knowledge, such as teachers, books, and
peers. In the special case of repeated complex tasks, like building air-
4A preliminary regression model also featured a significant (p < 0.01) interaction effect,
suggesting that brokering and specializing at the same time are beneficial for collectives
in complex environments.
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craft, specialization follows the well known learning curve [28]. We
would not want to say that all those learners are wasting their time
and should only muster diversity instead. Specialization to the level
of mastery makes it possible to use the acquired knowledge (partly)
routinely, and also enhances individuals’ as well as organizations’ ab-
sorptive capacity [29]. This enables to notice valuable information
amidst redundancy and noise, including brokering opportunities that
laymen overlook. “Chance favors the prepared mind,” as Louis Pas-
teur said. There is of course no guarantee whatsoever that trained
specialists become good brokers, or continue to be successful special-
ists, and they run a risk, individually and collectively, to get stuck in
a local optimum of their specialization [6]—their competency trap.
In complex fields, we should expect to see the best outcome in the
long run for those individuals and collectives who oscillate between,
or dynamically combine, specialization and brokerage, and not stay
permanently at either strategy or some place in between [9].5 Col-
lectives, such as large business companies with a R&D department,
may employ each strategy in a different part of their organization,
and teams may broker by a composition of non-overlapping special-
ists [32]. As we have seen, the most successful technology domains
combine brokerage, to collect diverse information, with specialization,
to accumulate and integrate this information to well-exploit it.6
We now have the tools to measure tie strength diversity and topo-
logical diversity, know more about the underlying mechanisms, can
predict when specialization matters, and tell why. Finally, we should
not forget that irrespective of diversity, good sources of information are
substantially more beneficial than arbitrary sources are. This holds
5The cognitive processes associated with brokerage and specialization are exploration
and exploitation, respectively. The human brain has different parts for each [30], and
noradrenaline helps regulating the dynamic balance between the two [31]. When the
temporal aspect is overlooked, paradoxes may result. When a broker gets to know her
contacts, or sources, well, she may exploit them, whereas progressive specialization is only
possible through exploring more efficient shortcuts or (re)combinations. The paradoxes
vanish when time is taken into account.
6Normalized entropy as discussed here captures both self and source specialization.
As a refinement of source specialization, nodes can also exchange information dyadically,
which we might call mutualistic specialization. For technology domains, it correlated pos-
itively with performance. A more interrelated knowledge base also results from cluster
specialization [4], i.e. when a focal node’s sources draw ideas from each other, either with
or without the focal node’s own doing. When a node’s local clustering increases, between-
ness necessarily decreases. Furthermore, there is geographic specialization in specific, often
proximate, areas, which also holds for patent citations [33]. Finally, there is status spe-
cialization (footnote 2), i.e. a preference for linking to high status nodes. In the case of
technology domains, it coincides with auto-regression (see main text).
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throughout society, from technology domains [15] to philosophers [34].
High performing nodes thus have an important spillover, of higher
quality knowledge for their network neighbors who specialize in them
(an instance of network auto-regression). On this note, we may end
with some practical advice. First, have good sources of information,
and keep in mind that having some good sources is better than having
just many. Second, make sure they are diverse. Third, integrate and
master complex information from these sources through specialization.
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